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RESUMO: Leitores da Apologia de Sócrates de Platão, de Xenofonte em diante, espantaram-se com o 
fato de que Sócrates, em contraste com outros defensores em julgamentos legais, parece provocar 
deliberadamente cólera em seu júri. Eu proponho que o uso que Sócrates faz de metáforas militares e 
sua alusão a Aquiles em particular, provê importantes mas negligenciadas pistas para seus motivos. Na 
Ilíada, como bem sabe o júri de Sócrates, um herói frequentemente admoesta o outro, provocando 
vergonha e cólera na intenção de incitar um guerreiro a lutar corajosamente. As admoestações de 
Sócrates aos atenienses seguem o padrão específico da admoestação homérica, e têm o mesmo 
objetivo: provocar cólera e vergonha na intenção de incitar sua audiência a buscar a virtude.  
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: cólera, admoestação, Sócrates, Platão, Apologia. 
ABSTRACT: Readers of Plato's Apology, from Xenophon on, have wondered why Socrates, in 
contrast to other defendants in legal trials, seems deliberately to arouse anger in his jury.  I argue that 
Socrates' use of military metaphors and his allusions to Achilles in particular provide important but 
neglected clues to his motives. In the Iliad, as Socrates' jury well knew, one hero frequently rebukes 
another, arousing shame and anger in order to stir a warrior to fight courageously.  Socrates' rebukes to 
the Athenians follow the specific pattern of the Homeric rebuke, and they have the same goal: to 
arouse anger and shame in order to stir his audience to pursue virtue.  




I. "Perhaps you would be annoyed" 
The ordinary defendant in a legal trial attempts to arouse pity in the jurors. There is 
good reason for this because, as David Konstan argues, pity presupposes the innocence of the 
accused.1 In contrast, Socrates in Plato's Apology explicitly condemns appeals to pity (for 
example, 34b4, 35b7), while he seems intent on arousing anger in the jury. He asks them, for 
example, not to make a disturbance (θορυβεῖν) if he speaks to them in his accustomed manner 
(17c6-d1, 27b1-2), or seems to be boasting (20e4-5, 21a5), or says other things that they 
dislike (30c3-7). He acknowledges that what he says may annoy them (ἄχθος: 31a4, 31e1-2) 
                                                        
1 Konstan 2001, 27-48, and 43, noting Aristotle's view that pity is for undeserved suffering (Po. 13.1453a5).  See 
also de Strycker and Slings 1994, 179-180. 
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or irritate them (ἀγανακτήσειεν: 34c1), thus causing them to harden themselves against him 
and to vote in anger (34c7-d1).  Socrates also often calls attention to the fact that he angered 
or aroused enmity in many Athenians before his trial.2  
   Various explanations have been offered for this apparently perverse and self-
destructive behavior. Xenophon writes of Socrates' arrogance (megalêgoria) and claims that 
he wanted the jury to condemn him to death because the god thought it was best for him to 
escape the troubles of old age (Ap. 5-9). Thomas West holds that Socrates "seems to go out of 
his way to boast about himself and to antagonize the jury," and that in so doing he is guilty of 
doing injustice.3 According to Erwin Wolff, however, Socrates is a pure example of 
Aristotle's great-souled man, who speaks freely because he despises others (NE 1124b27).4  
Gabriel Danzig holds that "Socrates frequently displays a strange combination of arrogance 
and humility.  This arises from the predicament Plato finds himself in: Socrates really did 
speak arrogantly."  Plato, according to Danzig, "acknowledges the arrogance while toning it 
down."5 Many explain Socrates' apparent arrogance as the result of his commitment to telling 
the truth, whatever the cost. C. D. C. Reeve, for example, takes issue with the view that 
Socrates "purposely antagonizes and alienates the jury," arguing that instead, he 
"subordinate[s] persuasion to telling the truth."6 A similar interpretation is offered by E. de 
Strycker and S. R. Slings, who hold that Socrates is portrayed as a "man who speaks the truth 
and cares only for justice (18a3-6), regardless of the consequences."7  According to John 
Burnet, Plato's "Socrates would have been glad to secure an acquittal (19a2sqq.), if that could 
be done without stooping to unworthy compromises which would give the lie to his whole life 
(38d3sqq)".8 And Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith argue that "Socrates must offer a 
sincere and effective defense, intended to convince his jurors of his innocence," and that "as 
he speaks to the jurors he cannot act in such a way as to violate his principles, even if acting 
in that way would be likely to arouse the sympathy of the jurors."9 
 I agree with those scholars who argue that Socrates is more concerned with telling the 
truth about himself than with being acquitted.  However, I hold that he has another goal, that 
of arousing his audience to pursue virtue, and that this goal leads him deliberately to arouse 
                                                        
2 See, for example, 21d1-2, 21e3-4, 23a1-2, 23c8-9, 23e5, 24a6-7, 28a6-9,  37c8-d2.  On the difference between 
anger and enmity see Konstan 2006, 185-6. 
3 West 1979, 79, 149-50. 
4 Wolff 1929, 6; cf. 27, 49-51, 67. 
5 Danzig 2003, 292. 
6 Reeve 1989, 6-7 
7 de Strycker and Slings 1994, 11-12. 
8 Burnet 1924, 145. 
9 Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 40-41 and 46, and 1984, with bibliography n. 3, 42-43. 
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anger in the jurors and in other Athenians--anger not against Socrates, but against themselves. 
His use of military metaphors, and, in particular, his allusions to Achilles provide an 
important, but neglected, clue to this goal. 
 Socrates frequently alludes to military activities in the Apology. The word he uses to 
refer to his examination of others, exetasis, originally had the military sense of "muster, 
review, scrutiny."10  He also calls attention to his own military service (28e1-4) and compares 
his life of examination to keeping his station in battle (28d5-29a2, 33e3-39b8).  Socrates not 
only reminds the jurors of contemporary military combat, he also compares his own 
willingness to risk his life to that of one particular warrior: Homer's Achilles.  This 
"demigod," he says, thought so little of death and danger, when set besides doing anything 
shameful, that he accepted his own death as the price of punishing Hektor for killing 
Patroklos (28b9-d4). Socrates' use of Achilles as a model is problematic and controversial in 
some respects.11 Achilles certainly provides a model of courageous behavior.  On the other 
hand, the angry and vengeful Achilles is very different from the Socrates who says that he is 
not distressed at the verdict (35e1), who states that during his lifetime he has restrained those 
who will punish the Athenians after his execution (39c3-d8), and who asks the jurors to give 
his sons the same "punishment" (τιµωρήσασθε) he himself gave the Athenians if his sons 
seem to care more for anything else than for virtue (41e1-42a1). 
 I also argue that Socrates uses the figure of Achilles not only because this hero acts 
courageously (even though his cause is dubious by Socratic standards), but also because 
Achilles evokes another important feature of Homeric military combat. In the Iliad, as the 
jury, and Plato's contemporary readers, would have been well aware, one hero frequently 
rebukes another, arousing shame and anger in order to stir him to fight courageously. This 
anger can be directed against oneself, as is the case, for example, in Iliad 98-104, (mis)quoted 
in Apology 28d2-3, where Achilles blames himself for the death of Patroklos. The example of 
Achilles, then, suggests that Socrates has the same goal as the rebukers in Homer: arousing 
anger and shame in order to stir people to pursue virtue. Further evidence that this is so is 
provided by the fact that Socrates' rebukes in the Apology follow the specific pattern of 
                                                        
10 Burnet 1924, on 22e6; Goldman 2004, 3, who also discusses Socrates' use of other military terms. Socrates 
uses exetasis and cognates at 22e6, 23c5-6, 24c3, 28e6, 33c3, 38a5-6. As Young 2002, 84-86 notes, the sharp 
distinction between exetasis and elenchus made by Tarrant 2002 does not take into account adequately the wide 
range of meanings of "elenchos" and cognates that are noted by Lesher 2002. 
11 On Socrates' comparison of himself to Achilles see Barrett 2001; Bloom 1968, 353-58; Clay 1972; Euben 
1990, 202-234; Hobbs 2000, 175-192; Irwin 1988; Stokes 1997, 142-43; West 1979, 151-166. 
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Homeric rebukes. In this way, as in many others, the Socrates of the Apology uses and adapts 
literary conventions.12 
 
II. Rebukes in Homer 
 In his study of battle scenes in the Iliad, Bernard Fenik lists three elements of a typical 
rebuke: (1) criticism; (2) description of bad situation, and (3) call to action.13 One example 
given by Fenik is the rebuke of Glaukos to Hektor in Iliad 16.537-47.14 In this passage: 
 
(1) Glaukos criticizes Hektor, saying:  
. . . Hektor,  
now you have utterly forgotten your armed companions 
who for your sake, far from their friends and the land of their fathers, 
are wearing their lives away, and you will do nothing to help them. (537-40) 15 
 
(2) Glaukos then describes the situation: 
Sarpedon has fallen, the lord of the shield-armoured Lykians, 
who defended Lykia in his strength and the right of his justice. 
Now brazen Ares has struck him down by the spear of Patroklos. (541-43) 
 
(3) Finally, Glaukos gives a call to action: 
Then, friends, stand beside me, let the thought be nemesis [indignation] in your spirit 
that they may strip away his arms, and dishonour his body, 
these Myrmidons, in anger for all the Danaans perished, 
those whom we Lykians have killed with the spear by the swift ships. (544-47)16  
 
 Elizabeth Minchin finds four elements in the Homeric rebuke instead of the three 
Fenik lists: (1) address, or emotional reaction, or words of reproach; (2) account of problem; 
(3) generalization from broader perspective, and (4) proposal for action.17  One example she 
discusses is Achilles' rebuke to Idomeneus and Aias, son of Oileus, when Idomeneus and Aias 
dispute about who is in the lead in the chariot race at Funeral Games in Iliad 23.492-98:  
(1) address: "Aias and Idomeneus" (493) 
(2) problem: "No longer now . . . continue to exchange this bitter and evil talk.  It is not 
becoming" (492-3) 
                                                        
12 de Strycker and Slings 1994 provide an excellent survey of Plato's use of rhetorical conventions in the 
Apology. 
13 Fenik 1968, 206. Cf. Edwards 1991, on Il. 17.140-168.  
14 Fenik 1968, 205-206. 
15 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Homer are those of Lattimore 1951, and other translations are my 
own. 
16 Lattimore, 1951, adapted. 
17 Minchin 2002, 75-76. 
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(3) action viewed from broader perspective: "If another acted so, you yourselves would be 
angry [nemesaton]" (494) 
(4) proposal: "Rather sit down again among those assembled and watch for the horses . . . 
Then you each can see for himself. . . ." (495-8).18 
 In addition to these three or four elements, Homeric rebukes often have two other 
characteristics.  First, as Richard Martin notes, in rebukes a praiseworthy foil is frequently 
juxtaposed to a blameworthy addressee.  For example, in rebuking Hektor in 17.140-165, 
Glaukos praises three different heroic alternatives: Sarpedon (152), Achilles (165), and Ajax 
(166-68).19  In some passages, this praiseworthy foil is the father of the addressee.  Fenik cites 
5.628-667, where Tlepolemos calls Sarpedon unworthy of his father.20  "The Homeric hero," 
comments Fenik, "assumes that excellence passes from one generation to the next, and that a 
father's prowess will reappear in his son.  A corollary is that the greater the father, the greater 
the son."21 
 Second, rebukes usually lead to action.  According to Fenik, they cause the rebuked 
person either to charge or to stir his men to fight.22 As Richard Janko notes, rebukes are 
usually obeyed without delay.23 Fenik does not list this result as an element in the "rebuke 
pattern," but he calls it "one of the most important patterns," and Janko incorporates it into his 
own account of Fenik's rebuke pattern: "X chides Y for not fighting, Y explains and X 
persuades him to enter battle; such exchanges often provoke aristeia."24  After the rebuke in 
16.537-54, for example, the Trojans "went straight for the Danaans, raging, and Hektor/ led 
them, in anger for Sarpedon" (16.552-3).25 In other passages also, the rebuker stirs the spirit in 
those he rebukes, thus leading them to act. For example, Poseidon stirs up (ἐποτρύων) the 
Argives in Iliad 13.95-98, and after he does so, they form ranks around the two Aiantes (125-
26).26 And in the Odyssey, Odysseus is stirred to compete in athletic contests by the insults of 
Euryalos, who calls him a "business man" (8.185, 205).  In the case of Achilles' rebuke to 
Idomeneus and Aias in Iliad 23, the result of the rebuke is stated by the narrator, before 
                                                        
18 Minchin 2002, 79-80, her translations. 
19 Martin 1989, 74. 
20 Fenik 1968, 66-67, also citing 4.370, and 5.800-835. 
21 Fenik 1968, 67 
22 Fenik 1968, 49. 
23 Janko 1992, on 16.722-5. 
24 Fenik 1968, 49; Janko 1992, 73, on 13.206-45, where he also cites examples.  
25 Among the other passages in which a rebuke has this effect, Fenik 1968, 49, lists 5.471-498, 17.70-83, 17.140-
233, 17.322-333, 17.582-591. 
26 On this passage see Janko 1992, 54-5.  Cf. 15.501-514, 17.179-186, where Hektor responds to another 
reproach by Glaukos by becoming aroused and going on to arouse others. 
ANAIS DE FILOSOFIA CLÁSSICA, vol. 3 nº 5, 2009 
ISSN 1982-5323 
Belfiore, Elizabeth 




recounting the rebuke itself: "And now the quarrel between the two of them would have gone 
still further, had not Achilleus himself risen up and spoken between them" (490-91).  In this 
case, the two Argive men do not fight a common enemy, but instead act properly by ceasing 
to fight between themselves. 
 The proper use of, and response to, rebukes is modeled in Agamemnon's rebuke of 
Diomedes in Iliad 4. Agamemnon accuses Diomedes of remaining behind in battle and being 
inferior to his father (4.370-400). Diomedes makes no reply, "feeling aidôs [shame or 
reverence] at the rebuke of the revered (aidoio) king" (402).  Sthenelos, in contrast, tells 
Agamemnon that he is lying (404). Diomedes then rebukes Sthenelos for his reply to 
Agamemnon:  
Friend, stay quiet rather and do as I tell you; I will 
find no fault [nemesô] with Agamemnon, shepherd of the people, 
for stirring thus into battle the strong-greaved Achaians; 
this will be his glory to come, if ever the Achaians 
cut down the men of Troy and capture sacred Ilion. 
If the Achaians are slain, then his will be the great sorrow. 
Come, let you and me remember our fighting courage (Il. 4.412-18). 
 
After this speech, Diomedes attacks the Trojans (419-21). 
 Diomedes' response to Agamemnon's rebuke, then, is not nemesis (anger or 
indignation) against Agamemnon, but aidôs for the king.  His aidôs leads Diomedes to accept 
the rebuke as an appropriate way to stir up the men. Diomedes then responds by acting to 
show the king that he is courageous and better than his own father. 
 As the passage in shows, rebukes are successful in large part because they have 
powerful emotional effects. In the first place, they arouse anger.27  After Glaukos rebukes 
Hektor in Il. 16.537-47, the Trojans feel sorrow at the death of Sarpedon (548), and Hektor 
leads them to battle, in anger (χωόµενος) for Sarpedon (553). Janko comments: "Glaukos' 
speech could not fail: the Trojans are grief-stricken . . . and anger fuels their ardor." 28 In other 
cases, anger is directed against the rebuker. Sometimes this anger is destructive, as, for 
example, when Achilles and Agamemnon quarrel in Iliad 1.  At other times, anger against the 
rebuker is combined with a more positive response, in which the person rebuked exhibits the 
courage or strength he has been accused of lacking. After Agamemnon rebukes Odysseus 
(4.336-348), Odysseus is angry with Agamemnon (ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν: 349; χωόµενος: 357) and 
tells him: "only watch . . . the very father of Telemachos locked with the champion of the 
                                                        
27 A nuanced account of anger in the Homeric epics is given by Konstan 2006, 41-55. 
28 Janko 1992, on 16. 548-53. 
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Trojans" (353-355). Agamemnon then takes back his reproach, saying that Odysseus does not 
deserve it (356-63). Odysseus reacts in a similar way in Odyssey 8. He at first declines to 
compete in athletic contests, and as a result is taunted by Euryalos, who accuses him of being 
a mere business man (158-64). Odysseus replies:  
Now you have stirred up anger [thumos] deep in the breast within me 
by this disorderly speaking, and I am not such a new hand 
at games as you say, but always, as I think, I have been 
among the best when I still had trust in youth and hands' strength. 
…………………. 
But even so for all my troubles I will try your contests, 
for your word bit in the heart, and you have stirred me by speaking (178-185) 
  
This same kind of "I'll show you!" response is made by Hektor after Glaukos accuses 
him of lacking the courage to stand up against Aias (Il.17.166-8).  Hektor replies:  
now I utterly despise your heart for the thing you have spoken 
when you said I cannot stand in the face of gigantic Aias. 
………….. 
Come here, friend, and watch me at work; learn, standing beside me, 
whether I shall be a coward all day, as you proclaim me, 
or whether I stop some Danaan, for all his fury, 
from his fighting strength………… (Il. 17.173-4, 179-81) 
  
Rebukes may arouse aidôs (shame) as well as anger, for example when Diomedes 
feels aidôs at the rebuke of Agamemnon (4.402). At lliad 15.661-66, Nestor urges the 
Achaians to keep aidôs in their hearts so as not to turn in fear.  Appeal to a sense of shame 
(aidôs), sometimes combined with an appeal to nemesis (anger or indignation) are common. 
Poseidon begins his rebuke to the Argives by appealing to shame:  
Shame [aidôs], you Argives, young fighting men, since I for my part 
have confidence that by fighting you can save our ships from destruction; 
but if you yourselves go slack from the sorrowful fighting 
now is seen your day to be beaten down by the Trojans. 
 
He concludes: Let every one of you plant in his heart's depth aidôs / and nemesis (Il. 13.95-
98, 121-2).29  
 As this last passage shows, there is a close connection between aidôs and nemesis, one 
of the "anger-terms" used by Homer.30  Scholars have often interpreted aidôs as the subjective 
counterpart of nemesis.  Richard Janko writes: "One should feel aidôs, 'a sense of shame,' 
before one's comrades (15.661ff) or the gods (Od. 9.269-71) . . . nemesis is the proper 
                                                        
29 Poseidon's speech is analyzed by Janko 1992, 54-5, who notes other passages that open with the same appeal 
to shame: Il.5.787=8.228 (αἰδως, Αργεῖοι, κάκ᾿ ἐλέγχεα), or involve an appeal to shame (15.561-4, cited p. 59).  
See also 17.336. 
30 See Cairns 2003, 21, on "anger-terms." 
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indignation felt by others at one's misconduct. . . . [A]idôs is thus the subjective counterpart of 
nemesis."31  This interpretation might appear to be supported by Achilles' rebuke to Aias and 
Idomeneus in Il. 23.494: "If another acted so, you yourselves would feel nemesis."32  
However, David Konstan makes a strong case against this subjective-objective distinction, 
arguing that "both sentiments are best treated as self-regarding, the one indicating respect, the 
other disapproval."  This interpretation is supported by the fact that nemesis can be directed 
against oneself if one does a shameful act.33  At Il. 16.544-46, for example, after Patroklos has 
killed Sarpedon, Glaukos urges his companions to keep nemesis in their hearts, lest they and 
the corpse suffer shameful things.  Cairns writes: 
[T]he nemesis of Sarpedon's fellow soldiers is directed not at Patroclus but at themselves; the 
breach of aidôs is their own, or would be.  There are two sides to the reaction of shame at the 
prospect of disgrace: the inhibitory, when the agent suppresses the action which might lead to 
ignominy; and the angry, resentful aspect, which comes into play when the reprehensible 
action is abandoned and positive steps are taken to wipe out any suggestion of an insult; this 
emotion can be covered by aidôs ... but here it is expressed by nemesis. 34 
 
Thus, the aidôs that is necessary for courageous action has a component of anger, for it 
involves a disposition, when acting shamefully, to feel against oneself the anger (or 
indignation) that one would be justified in feeling against another person who did shameful 
things.  
 There are many other examples of anger aroused by rebukes of oneself. Odysseus's 
anger against himself is expressed vividly in his memorable rebuke of his own heart: "Striking 
the heart in his breast, he rebuked it in words (ἠνίπαπε µύθῳ): 'Endure, heart' " (Od. 20.17-
18; quoted in Rep. 4.441b).  Τhe same phrase appears in rebukes in Il. 2.245 (Odysseus to 
Thersites) and 17.141 (Glaukos to Hektor).  Another example of anger against oneself, this 
time combined with shame, is provided by Achilles' reaction when he learns of the death of 
Patroklos (Iliad 18). Konstan argues correctly that Achilles is motivated by grief over the loss 
of Patroklos rather than anger over a slight after this event.35  However, the close connection 
just discussed between shame and anger suggests that not only grief but also anger against 
himself motivates Achilles. He had earlier rejected the appeal, made by Aias during the 
Embassy, to cease from his wrath in reverence (aidôs) for those who supplicate him within his 
house (9.640). Now he bitterly regrets doing so.  When he first learns of his companion's 
                                                        
31 Janko 1992, 59. Other examples of this view are given by Konstan 2006, 117. 
32 This passage is discussed by Cairns 1993, 98. 
33 Konstan 2006, 118. 
34 Cairns 1993, 84.  See also Cairns 2003, 33-38. 
35 Konstan 2006, 52. 
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death, Achilles has to be restrained for fear lest he cut his throat (18.32-34).  He also 
expresses his desire to die when he tells Thetis that he wishes she had never married Achilles' 
father (86-7).  His words at 98-104 are a powerful expression of a desire, brought about by 
shame and anger against himself, to die in avenging his friend:  
I must die soon, then; since I was not to stand by my companion  
when he was killed.  And now, far away from the land of my fathers, 
he has perished, and lacked my fighting strength to defend him. 
. . . I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other 
 companions who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor, 
 but sit here beside my ships, a useless weight on the land. (Il.18. 98-104)  
  
Although this passage is not usually classified as a rebuke, it contains the three 
elements of Fenik's typical rebuke: 
(1) criticism: "I was no light of safety to Patroklos . . ." 
(2) description of situation: "he has perished" 
(3) call to action: "I must die soon." That is, Achilles resolves to take vengeance on Hektor, 
even though he knows that this will cost him his life (114-116). 
 This passage is of particular interest because Socrates misquotes it in Apology 28d2-4, 
where he compares himself to Achilles.  According to Socrates, Achilles says: "May I die 
soon, having done justice to the one who acted unjustly, so that I may not remain here, 
laughed at beside the curved ships, a weight on the land." Socrates suppresses Achilles' 
shameful action in failing to stand by Patroklos, and his anger against himself.  In mentioning 
justice, moreover, Socrates attributes to Achilles a motive different from that of the Homeric 
hero.  In the Iliad, Achilles acts because he is ashamed of failing to protect his friend, and 
because he desires vengeance and honor.  In contrast, Socrates represents Achilles as 
motivated by a desire for justice.  In these ways, Socrates, who has no reason to be ashamed 
of or angry with himself, rewrites the text of Homer's text in order to make Achilles a more 
suitable model.36 
 Homeric rebukes, then, often appeal to aidôs and nemesis, and can arouse anger in the 
person rebuked against  (1) the rebuker, (2) an enemy, (3) the person himself, if he is doing 
(or if he should do) something shameful.  
 
 
                                                        
36 Labarbe 1949, 340-344 provides an exhaustive survey of the differences between Plato and our text of Homer, 
arguing that Plato's memory failed him.  Analyses of the differences based on the assumption that Plato 
deliberately manipulated the text are provided by Benardete 1963; Hobbs 2000, 183-184; Stokes 1997, 142-144; 
West 1979, 59-60, n.79, and 155-160. 
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III. Socrates' Rebukes to the Athenians 
 What does all this have to do with Plato's Apology?  When Socrates arouses anger in 
the jury, he does so within a context that is established by means of his references to military 
service in general and to Achilles in particular.  In particular, he evokes the Homeric rebuke 
by using the same four elements that Minchin finds in this pattern, and by alluding to a 
praiseworthy foil.  In so doing, Socrates, like the Homeric heroes, attempts to arouse in the 
members of the jury shame, and anger against themselves, in order to provoke them to pursue 
virtue.   
 These features of Socrates' address are especially clear from his words at 29d2-30b4, 
in which he speaks "in his accustomed manner": 
I cherish and love you, O Athenian men, but I will obey the god rather than you. As 
long as I breathe and am able to do so,  I will never stop philosophizing and exhorting 
and showing you, saying, in my accustomed manner: "O best of men, being an 
Athenian, of the city that is greatest and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are 
you not ashamed [αἰσχύνῃ] of caring for how you will acquire the most money, and 
for reputation and honor, but as for truth and how your soul will be as good as 
possible, you neither care for these things nor consider them?  And if someone of you 
disagrees and says that he does care, I will not immediately let him go, nor will I go 
away, but I will question and examine and refute him.  And if he does not seem to me 
to have acquired virtue, but says that he has done so, I will blame him for valuing 
least that which is worth most, and for placing more value on inferior things . . . . I do 
nothing other than go around and persuade you . . . to care neither for your bodies, 
nor for money, either instead of, or so much as, how your soul will be as good as 
possible, saying: 'Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and 
all other good things for humans.' " (Ap. 29d2-30b4). 37  
  
In this speech, Socrates makes use of all four of the elements Minchin finds in 
Homeric rebukes: 
(1) Socrates addresses the Athenians: "Oh Athenian men" (29d2); “Oh best of men, being an 
Athenian" (29d7). 
(2) He then states the problem: "are you not ashamed of caring for how you will acquire the 
most money, and for reputation and honor, but as for truth and how your soul will be as good 
as possible, you neither care for these things nor consider them?" (29d9-e3). 
(3) Socrates also provides a generalization from a broader perspective: people who act in this 
way value most highly what is in fact inferior (30a1-3): "virtue does not come from money, 
but from virtue comes money and all other good things for humans" (30b2-4). 
                                                        
37 My translation follows the interpretation of de Strycker and Slings 1994, 138-140, 234-235.  Alternatively, 
30b3-4 can be rendered: "It is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men" (Burnet 1924, ad 
loc).  Although neither translation is without difficulties, this issue does not affect my main points. 
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(4) Socrates does not explicitly propose action in this passage. However, such a proposal is 
implicit in his statement of the problem: care for virtue and your soul more than for money, 
honor and reputation.  
 Moreover, just as Homeric heroes compare those they rebuke to a praiseworthy foil, 
for example, their fathers, so Socrates compares the Athenians to a similarly praiseworthy 
foil: their fatherland, "the city that is greatest and most renowned for wisdom and strength" 
(29d7-8).  Like many Homeric rebukers, Socrates appeals to shame ("Are you not ashamed?" 
29d9).  The Homeric model makes it reasonable to suppose that Socrates rebukes the 
members of the jury not in order to arouse their anger against himself, but in order to arouse 
the shame and anger against themselves that will stir them to pursue virtue.38 
 The idea that Socrates attempts to arouse anger against themselves in the members of 
the jury is supported by his explicit statements in the Apology. Those examined by people 
who imitate his methods, he says, are angry with him and not themselves (23c8-d1).39 The 
implication is that the appropriate response is anger with oneself. In other dialogues also, 
shame and anger with oneself are identified as the intended result of the elenchos.40 For 
example, in Sophist 230b4-d4, those who undergo the "purification of the elenchos" are said 
to be angry with themselves and mild toward others" (230b8-c1), and those practicing the 
elenchos realize that people will never benefit from learning "until someone by cross-
examining brings the person examined to a state of shame (aischynê)" (230d1-2).41 In 
Theaetetus 168a, Socrates says that a properly conducted elenchos leads to self-blame and 
self-hatred on the part of the person refuted, and affection for the refuter. In Hippias Major 
Socrates himself models the appropriate response to the elenchos: shame and anger with 
oneself, and a resolve to become able to fight better against arguments.  He reports his 
reactions to a certain questioner, who asks if he is not ashamed of daring to speak on matters 
he knows nothing about (304d5-8).  This questioner, before whom Socrates says that he 
would be most ashamed if he were to think he said something of value while actually saying 
nothing, turns out to be himself (298b7-11).42  After going away from this questioner, 
Socrates is angry with himself, and he blames and threatens himself.  As a result, Socrates 
                                                        
38 On the importance of shame in the Socratic elenchus see Belfiore 1992, 331-335; Gordon 1999, 22-29; Kahn 
1996, 137-142; McKim 1988, Renaud 2002, Seeskin 1987, 14-15; Teloh 1986 (for example: 1, 11, 23); 
Woodruff 2000, esp. 144. 
39 I read αὑτοῖς with Burnet 1924, ad loc; Stokes 1997, ad loc; de Strycker and Slings 1994, ad loc, rather than 
αὐτοῖς with Buttrey 1981. 
40 The passages from Soph., HM, and Tht. cited below are noted by de Strycker and Slings 1994, 292-3, on 23c8. 
On anger with oneself see also Rep. 4.440b1-2.   
41 On this process see Belfiore 1992, 331-335 
42 On Socrates' questioner see Woodruff 1982, 43-44, n. 47, and 107-108. 
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says, using a military metaphor, he resolves to learn so that he will be able to fight 
(ἀναµαχούµενος) the arguments of the questioner (286d3-7).   
 
IV. The Verdict 
 Unlike the typical Homeric rebuker, Socrates does not succeed in stirring the majority 
of the jurors to become angry with themselves and to pursue virtue.  On the contrary, they 
strike Socrates in anger, as he predicted they might (31a3-5), by voting to condemn him.  
Nevertheless, his speech, and his "accustomed manner" of addressing the Athenians (29d2-3) 
do succeed with a great many people.  Socrates persuades almost half of the jury that he is 
innocent (35e1-36b2).43 Moreover, he has won over a great many other people, including the 
young men who will blame the Athenians after his death (39d1-3), and the men whose names 
and relatives he mentions at 33e1-34a2.44 Why does Socrates succeed with some people and 
not with others?  Here again, a comparison of Socrates and Homeric rebukers can help us to 
answer this questions. 
 Both Socrates' rebukes to the Athenians and Homeric rebukes are usually addressed to 
a single person, and are specifically tailored to fit this person's individual character and 
situation.  As I have noted, Minchin's four elements of the rebuke include an address by name, 
an account of a specific problem, and a proposal for specific action.45  Similarly, Socrates' 
usual procedure involves questioning, examining and refuting a single individual, who claims 
that he cares for his soul more than for honor and money. This is clear from his use of the 
singular in his self-quotation at 29d3-5: "O best of men". A sample of this kind of 
examination, addressed to an individual who makes specific claims, is given in the Apology in 
the form of Socrates' questioning of Meletus (24c4-28a1).46  In court, however, Socrates 
cannot examine and question each of the jurors individually, but must address a crowd.  In 
this context, each individual is less likely to experience shame because his individual claims 
to care about the soul necessarily go unexamined. Both Socratic and Homeric rebukes 
addressed to individuals, whether in philosophical discussion or in battle, are more likely to 
succeed than rebukes to a large jury. 
 Socrates is also less likely to succeed in court than Homeric rebukers do because of an 
important difference in his usual procedure.  Homeric rebukes are usually made in the heat of 
                                                        
43 On this point see Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 214. 
44 Burnet 1924 correctly notes that those named are all followers of Socrates. De Strycker and Slings 1994 
concur and argue that they are supporters of the democracy (173-175).  
45 Minchin 2002, 75-76. 
46 On Socrates' questioning of Meletus as an example of Socratic dialectic see de Strycker and Slings 1994, 103. 
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battle, when there is little time for discussion.  Socrates' customary rebukes, however, are 
usually made in the context of the questioning and examining that requires a great deal of 
time and leisure.  In court, of course, he does not have this time.  Indeed, Socrates suggests 
that leisure plays an essential role in the votes of the jury.  The examinations he has conducted 
prior to his appearance in court have required all of his time, thus causing him to neglect his 
own affairs (31a-b, 36b-d, 37e-38a). Now, when he needs to make a defense, he says, it is 
difficult to remove such great prejudices in so little time (19a1-2, 24a2-4). If he had had more 
time than one day, he says, he would have been able to persuade the whole jury to acquit him 
(37a9-b2). Socrates also alludes to the importance of leisure when he invites those who voted 
to acquit him to remain and converse (dialegesthai) with him while the magistrates are busy 
(literally, "lack leisure": 39e1-5).  Moreover, Socrates suggests that those who have been 
persuaded by him are those who have the most leisure to spend in conversation.  The young 
men who listen most to Socrates are "the most wealthy, those who have leisure" (23c2-3).  
From what we know of the historical figures, this is in fact true of most of the followers he 
names at 33e1-34a2.47  In contrast, the majority of the jury, those who vote to convict him, 
have not had these advantages. 
 Socrates has used the Homeric rebuke as a model throughout his speech, but he ends 
with an allusion to the difference just noted between his method and that of the Homeric 
rebuker: the absence of time for lengthy examination in Homeric rebukes.  The best thing 
about dying and going to Hades, he says, would be to be able to spend time examining the 
dead, for example, Agamemnon and Odysseus, to see who is wise, and who thinks he is wise 
but is not (41b5c1).  This kind of examination, of course, is absent not only from the Homeric 
battlefield, but also from the leisured conversations reported in the epics.  In examining the 
Homeric heroes, Socrates proposes to examine Homer himself, whose rebukes he has used as 
a model adapted to his own purposes. 
  
 This paper has examined one previously unnoticed model for Socrates' speech in the 
Apology, a model that helps to explain his motives for deliberately arousing anger in his 
audience.  The Homeric model does not, of course, explain why the philosopher is 
                                                        
47 Socrates mentions Crito and his son Critobulus, Lysanias and his son Aeschines, Antiphon and his son 
Epigenes, Nicostratus the son of Theozotides and the brother of Theodotus, Paralios the son of Demodokos and 
his brother Theages, Adeimantus the son of Ariston and his brother Plato, Aeantodorus and his brother 
Apollodorus.  Of these, Plato, Crito, Critobulus and Apollodorus offer to pay, on Socrates' behalf, a fine of thirty 
minae, "a considerable sum" (West 1979, 65, n.115).  Of the others, Nicostratus was wealthy, Antiphon well-off, 
and Demodokos enjoyed many offices and honors.  Only Aeschines was poor (Nails 2002). 
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represented as angering the jury and the Athenians in many other ways, for example, by his 
counter-proposal of dining in the prytaneum, and his refusal to give up philosophizing. These 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. Socrates' use of the rebuke format, however, is 
evidence that the anger aroused by Socrates is not always a bad thing, but can be used, like 
the sting of the gadfly, to awaken those who are sleeping (30e1-31a2).  
 
 
[Recebido em março de 2009; aceito em março de 2009.] 
